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UNJUSTLY ENRICHED PRISONS: THE PROBLEM WITH
CAPITALIZING ON CAPTIVITY
Jazmen Howard*
Abstract
This Note sheds light on state practices that take advantage of
vulnerable, captive consumers: inmates. States regularly negotiate
contracts relating to services and benefits for inmates, using inmates—a
captive market—to enrich themselves. States make key decisions, force
changes, and earn profits by implementing contracts that affect inmates
and explicitly block inmates from pursuing any standing to negotiate the
contracts or to sue for any contractual breaches. A current controversy
that provides an example of states’ consciously taking advantage of
captive consumers involves giving, taking, and altering access to music
and video devices. In that scenario, as a state continues to switch
providers and increase profits, inmates must blindly surrender prior
contract benefits in exchange for a new, different set of benefits and
burdens. In such situations, inmates suffer both tangible and intangible
losses, and states often disregard the adverse effects their business
decisions may have on captive markets—especially when a state’s profit
is completely dependent on its captive consumers. This Note focuses on
the states’ gain and proposes a novel theory of unjust enrichment
recovery if, in fact, prisons are unjustly benefiting at inmates’ expense.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenario: Michael has been incarcerated in a
state prison system for the last five years. At the beginning of his
incarceration, Michael used his commissary account to purchase a media
player and several songs to begin building his music library. The
reasonable consumer expectation—even in prison—is that at the end of
his incarceration, Michael will pay a onetime fee and take the media
player home with him. However, the prison system recently announced
that it will be switching media providers. As a result, Michael will have
to forfeit his media player and lose all the files he has purchased over the
last few years. Michael must determine whether he would like to keep his
current media player—without the opportunity to add any additional song
files to his music library—or sacrifice his current media player to
participate in the new media arrangement. If Michael decides to forfeit
his media player, he will have the opportunity to repurchase his song files
through the new service provider at his own expense. However, the
decision to repurchase his music will create another round of commission
for the prison and additional expenses for Michael and his family. There
are countless prisoners like Michael. And all the while, prisons profit
more and more.
This example illustrates how prisons profit—sometimes repeatedly—
from captive consumers without regard for inmate choice, autonomy, or
identity. Because inmates like Michael have little choice (and even less
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control) as consumers within the prison system, a prison1 can profit by
structuring the captive market to benefit the prison—the product
provider—rather than the inmate, the ultimate consumer. Apart from any
constitutional or criminal protections afforded to inmates, such practices
raise serious concerns about the propriety of these enrichments.2 This
Note discusses seemingly minor contractual decisions that provide
benefits to inmates, and the major consequences that those minor
decisions may cause. Even operating under the assumption that inmates
are fortunate to have luxuries such as media players and song libraries, it
is possible that public prisons are consciously enriching themselves at the
expense of their captive consumers. Could this enrichment be unjust? The
law of unjust enrichment provides a viable path for holding prisons
accountable for systemic overreach, which occurs when prisons profit—
on a large scale—by using control over a captive market to the prisons’
advantage. Media-provider agreements are only one example of
potentially abusive tactics that undervalue inmates as consumers and line
prisons’ pockets.3 Unjust enrichment may correct this imbalance.
Michael’s hypothetical situation loosely tracks events currently
unfolding in Florida, though these scenarios are not unique to Florida.4
The Florida Department of Corrections (FDC)5 has decided to end a
seven-year contract with Access Corrections (owned by the Keefe
Group)6 that allowed inmates to purchase MP3 players, accessories, and
1. See Gary F. Cornelius, Jails, Pre-Trial Detention, and Short Term Confinement, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 389, 389 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R.
Reitz eds., 2012) (“Jails are not prisons. A prison is defined as a correctional facility, administered
by the federal government or a state government, that confines adult offenders who are sentenced
to terms of confinement for more than one year.”). This Note focuses on the conscious advantage
taking of inmates within the prison system, though similar issues may be occurring in jails around
the nation.
2. See discussion infra Section III.B.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 25–37.
4. For example, inmates of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections also experienced
similar issues. See Mia Armstrong, Return to Sender: No More Mailing Books to Inmates in
Pennsylvania, SLATE (Sept. 19, 2018, 6:58 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/09/
pennsylvania-prisons-ban-book-donations-ebooks.html [https://perma.cc/6JES-HRZK] (explaining
the implications of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’s decision to eliminate inmates’
personal ownership of physical books within the facilities). Though beyond the scope of this Note,
it would be worthwhile to conduct a nationwide study to determine the systemic consequences
that occur as a result of these profit-centered tactics.
5. The Florida Department of Corrections operates Florida state prisons. See FLA. DEP’T
CORRECTIONS, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/ [https://perma.cc/XHN7-6LXE] (“As Florida’s largest
state agency, and the third largest prison system in the country, FDC employs 24,000 members,
incarcerates approximately 96,000 inmates and supervises nearly 166,000 offenders in the
community.”).
6. When referring to the media program, this Note uses the name “Access Corrections.”
Access Corrections is the entity within the Keefe Group that focuses on the MP3 player programs.
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song files.7 The FDC has entered into a new contract with JPay, a
company that competes with Access Corrections.8 Under the terms of the
JPay Contract, inmates have the option to purchase tablets that can access
email, music, games, movies, and educational content for various prices.9
Importantly, a Florida prison policy prevents inmates from owning more
than one media device at a time.10 As a result, Florida inmates will have
to forfeit the MP3 players they purchased from Access Corrections to
participate in the JPay Tablet Program.11 Maybe one device is preferable
to the other, and maybe not. The danger here is that the prison is operating
with a profit-centered vision, and the directly affected parties—the
inmates and the public—have no seat at the negotiating table.
Collectively, Florida inmates have suffered an estimated $11.3 million
loss due to this change of contract.12 Under the Access Corrections
Contract, the FDC received $1.4 million in commissions.13 Under the
See Access Corrections, KEEFE GROUP, https://www.keefegroup.com/companies/accesscorrections-114 [https://perma.cc/MZ2B-GJYP].
7. See Contract between the Fla. Dep’t of Corr. & Keefe Commissary Network, LLC
amend. 1, ¶ 1 (Mar. 29, 2009) [hereinafter Keefe Contract], https://facts.fldfs.com/Search/
ContractSearch.aspx (enter “C2562” in the “Agency Assigned Contract ID (if known)” field; click
search; navigate to “Results” and click view under “View Audits”; click document tab; click view
PDF of Amendment #6).
8. See Contract between the Fla. Dep’t of Corr. & JPay, Inc. (Apr. 17, 2017) [hereinafter
JPay Contract], https://facts.fldfs.com/Search/ContractSearch.aspx (enter “C2885” in the
“Agency Assigned Contract ID (if known)” field; click search; navigate to “Results” and click
view under “View Audits”; click document tab; click view PDF of Original Contract).
9. See id. § II.F.3.a (describing certain services offered by JPay); see also Help, JPAY,
https://www.jpay.com/Phelp.aspx [https://perma.cc/6N7Q-A65K] (describing services offered by
JPay).
10. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 33-602.201 app. (2019) (designating one MP3 player
per inmate as the maximum authorized personal articles of property within Florida state prisons).
11. See Ben Conarck, Florida Inmates Spent $11.3M on MP3s. Now Prisons are Taking
Players., DAYTONA BEACH NEWS J. (Aug. 12, 2018, 6:39 PM), http://www.news-journalonline.
com/news/20180812/florida-inmates-spent-113m-on-mp3s-now-prisons-are-taking-players
[https://perma.cc/6GAX-7SL2]; Cory Doctorow, Captive Audience: How Florida’s Prisons and
DRM Made $11.3M Worth of Prisoners’ Music Disappear, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug.
9, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/08/captive-audience-how-floridas-prisons-anddrm-made-113m-worth-prisoners-music [https://perma.cc/6EP7-PZ8H].
12. See Conarck, supra note 11 (“More than 30,299 players were sold, and 6.7 million songs
were downloaded over the life of the Access contract, according to the Department of Corrections.
That’s about $11.3 million worth of music.”). This Note does not focus on the profit making of
the third-party vendors, though consumer rights organizations may wish to monitor those
endeavors. The vendors negotiate with the prisons—rather than the inmates—such that the vendor
profits are more aligned with traditional contract norms and relative bargaining power of the two
in privity. See id. The vendors also profit from indirect access to inmates, but the prisons are the
entities that are directly—and consciously—disadvantaging inmates within their custody and
control.
13. Id.
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JPay Contract, the FDC stands to receive value-added services and
(more) commission.14 The FDC will receive a second round of profits for
any song that the Florida inmates decide to repurchase for their music
libraries, even though, under the Access Corrections Contract, the prisons
have already received commission from a similar purchase.15
This Note reveals the impact that profit-centered business tactics may
have on captive consumers and their families. Further, it explains the
shortcomings of contract law as it relates to third-party beneficiaries and
suggests unjust enrichment law as a possible cause of action given such
shortcomings. Because the inmates are, by the terms of the contract,
incidental beneficiaries, traditional contract law will not afford them a
remedy—or even standing to sue.16 Yet, prisons are still consciously
enriching themselves and the wrongful profiting continues. Accordingly,
this Note explores the novel theory of unjust enrichment as a solution to
best protect inmates’—and perhaps the public’s—interests and to unravel
the benefits obtained at captive consumers’ expense.
Part I provides general background information on the prison
commissary system and captive markets. More specifically, Part I
summarizes the history of privatization in prisons and explains how this
privatization has led to an increase in prison benefits and inmate losses.
This phenomenon, in turn, plays into the idea of captive markets because
inmates must make an “all or nothing” decision: purchase whatever the
private company has to offer and accept the terms of the contract between
the prison and the private company, or make no purchase at all.
Part II explains the contractual relationships between the FDC and
private companies and details the terms and conditions of each contract.
Part II also includes summaries of the key entities’ roles and analyzes
how a change in contract will benefit the FDC while costing inmates and
their families millions of dollars.
Part III explains traditional contract law’s third-party-beneficiary
doctrine and addresses this concept’s failure to afford inmates the right
to litigate on their own behalves. If inmates had contract rights,
compensatory harms might be recoverable; however, prison systems
design these contracts to leave the inmates vulnerable. The contracts
14. See JPay Contract, supra note 8, § II.F.18; id. amend. 1, ¶¶ 2, 7.
15. For a discussion of how the prison system is profiting at the expense of inmates, see
Conarck, supra note 11, which provides statements from grievances filed by inmates and
interviews with their families. See also Doctorow, supra note 11 (“[T]he Florida Department of
Corrections and Jpay are poised to convert their captive population of prisoners into cash cows,
to be milked for every penny their families can spare.”); Daniel Wagner, Profiting from Prisoners:
Prison Bankers Cash in on Captive Customers, CTR. PUB. INTEGRITY (Nov. 11, 2014, 10:07 AM),
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/09/30/15761/prison-bankers-cash-captive-customers
[https://perma.cc/7Y2X-7ECQ] (“JPay has become a critical financial conduit for an opaque
constellation of vendors that profit from millions of poor families with incarcerated loved ones.”).
16. See, e.g., JPay Contract, supra note 7, § VII.Z.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 1 [], Art. 4

132

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

purposely place inmates in a lack-of-privity position as incidental, rather
than intended, third-party beneficiaries. As intended beneficiaries,
inmates would have the opportunity to attack these injustices. Since, in
this particular Florida example, inmates do not have contract rights,
inmates may need to turn from a compensation model to a gain-based
inquiry—that is, from a contract lens to a restitution lens—to recover
their losses. Part III also explains the concept of restitution and unjust
enrichment and how such a concept may allow Florida inmates and
citizens to bring claims against the FDC—even while they lack standing
under tort, property, and contract law.
Part IV provides solutions to remedy the injustices created when
prisons contract with private companies and create compulsory contracts
that do not consider inmates’ interests. These contracts expressly
eliminate intended third-party beneficiaries, forcing inmates out of
privity and into the role of the private companies’ sole consumers.
Accordingly, Part IV addresses remedies that may be available to combat
unjust profiting and offers a suggestion to the legislature on how to
prevent the wrongful retention of profits moving forward.
I. BANKING ON BONDAGE: THE PRIVATIZATION OF PRISONS AND THE
CAPTIVE MARKET
“We a for-profit prison now. We ain’t people no more.
We bulk items.”17
The privatization of prisons allows for-profit companies to monetize
“the physical incarceration and regulation of human bodies.”18 As a
captive market, inmates find few choices and high prices as consumers.
When companies contract with the best interests of a business in mind,
the rights, fair treatment, and rehabilitation of prisoners—wards of the
state—take a back seat. When private companies profit at inmates’
expense—by using the commissary system and Inmate Trust Fund
accounts19 as money-making mechanisms rather than as tools to improve
inmates’ quality of life—“monetization” begins to look like unjust
enrichment.20 This context and “income” model show how prisons garner
unjust gains by capitalizing on captivity.
17. Orange Is the New Black: Work that Body for Me (Netflix television series June 17,
2016).
18. Laura I. Appleman, Cashing in on Convicts: Privatization, Punishment, and the People,
2018 UTAH L. REV. 579, 579.
19. See discussion infra Section I.B.
20. See generally DAN B. DOBBS & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—
EQUITY—RESTITUTION 369–88 (3d ed. 2018) (explaining the theory of restitution and unjust
enrichment).
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A. Captive Markets
Inmates are the ultimate “captive market.”21 “Captive markets” are
defined as “[m]arkets where the potential consumers face a severely
limited amount of competitive suppliers; their only choices are to
purchase what is available or to make no purchase at all. Captive
markets result in higher prices and less diversity for consumers.”22 This
type of system is most common in prisons because each prison may
contract with whomever, and on whatever terms, it wants. That is, a
prison may choose to enter into a contract with whichever private
company will provide the prison with the maximum quantity—or
quality—of benefits; a prison need not consider what may be best for the
inmate population.23 In turn, prisons present inmates with few product
options and inflated prices.24 Prisons enter the bargaining process with a
profit-centered approach rather than considering the adverse effect that
such an approach may have on inmates, who are a vital part of the
negotiation process. For prisons, a larger number of inmates presents a
bargaining advantage because an increased number of consumers
generally means more profits for both private companies and prisons.
The privatization of prisons has created new issues within prison
markets.25 For instance, the increase in privatized phone and visitation
services allows prisons to “not only make money off the backs of a
captive population, but also reduce the contact and social bonds between
prisoners and their home communities.”26 Each prison stands to profit
21. See, e.g., Implications of the Fair Labor Standards Act for Inmates, Correctional
Institutions, Private Industry, and Labor: Hearing on S. 1115 Before the Comm. on Labor &
Human Res., 103d Cong. 37 (1993) (statement of Sue Perry) (“[P]rison-made products do not
even have to be competitively priced with private sector products, and these prison industries truly
have a captive market.”).
22. Captive Market, LAW DICTIONARY (emphasis added), https://thelawdictionary.org/
captive-market/ [https://perma.cc/XG7A-QTQ6].
23. See Appleman, supra note 18, at 583–84.
24. For example, a 4.2-ounce tube of Colgate toothpaste may cost $3.41 in prison, while
that same tube may cost someone who is not incarcerated far less than $3.41. See Keefe Contract,
supra note 7, attachment 1. Keefe Commissary provided inmates with two choices of toothpaste.
Id. The prices were listed as $3.41 and $3.49. Id.
25. See Appleman, supra note 18, at 595–607 (explaining that the quality of aspects such
as health care, transportation, banking, phone and visitation services, and food services has
significantly decreased due to for-profit providers).
26. Id. at 603–04 (“Currently, prison phone companies can charge eleven cents a minute to
prison inmates, and fourteen to twenty-two cents a minute to jail inmates. This is an improvement
on the almost $1 per minute rate that was charged until 2015, when the [Federal Communications
Commission] capped the vast majority of prison phone and limited the amount of add-on fees.
These fees were a major source of revenue for prison phone companies.” (footnote omitted)). For
a further discussion of the Obama Administration’s efforts to minimize the costly effects of the
privatized phone industry, see Dana Liebelson, Obama Administration Approves Plan to Make

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 1 [], Art. 4

134

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

from these captive markets by selecting companies that will offer the
prison the highest amount of commission27 or, in some situations, the
largest amount of value-added services.28
“Securus, Global Tel*Link, and CenturyLink, which control over
eighty percent of prison phone business nationwide, have spent millions
of dollars on lobbying and political contributions”29 to pass legislation
banning and criminalizing the possession of cell phones within prison
facilities.30 The most common use of cell phones within prisons was to
communicate with family members; the cost of maintaining an active cell
phone line is cheaper than paying for phone calls from the prisons.31
Securus, Global Tel*Link, and CenturyLink were at the forefront of the
movement to criminalize the possession of cell phones within prisons,
and this criminalization meant more income for these private
companies.32 Unfortunately, supporting legislation and political
decisions to directly increase private companies’ revenue is not the only
instance of ethically questionable business tactics within the captive
market arena.33
Private companies used similar tactics during the growth of video
visitation services. For instance, until May 2015, Securus Technology
would not enter into a contract with any prison unless the prison agreed
to eliminate in-person visits.34 Securus sought to ban in-person visitation
Prison Phone Calls More Affordable, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 22, 2015, 11:23 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/prison-phone-costs-fcc-obama_us_5628f5f0e4b0443bb56
2d907 [https://perma.cc/PZQ8-BD8N], and Ben Walsh, Prison Phone Company Fights to Keep
Profiting Off Inmates and Their Families, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 28, 2016), http://www.huffing
tonpost.com/entry/securus-technologies-prison-phone-industry_us_5627c31ee4b02f6a900f0837
[https://perma.cc/9E6P-CDJ7].
27. Appleman, supra note 18, at 603.
28. See, e.g., JPay Contract, supra note 8, § II.F.18.
29. Appleman, supra note 18, at 604; see also Private Prison Phone Companies Lobbied
for Criminalization of Cell Phones in Prisons, EJI (Feb. 8, 2016), https://eji.org/news/privatecompanies-lobbied-to-criminalize-cell-phones-in-prisons [https://perma.cc/MV6T-3AMD]
(“Securus spent nearly $75,000 solely on lobbying for the Cell Phone Contraband Act, and
CenturyLink spent $1,060,796, $3,850,000, and $4,170,000 on campaign contributions in 2012,
2013, and 2014, respectively.”).
30. Appleman, supra note 18, at 604.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See IN THE PUB. INTEREST, HOW PRIVATE PRISON COMPANIES INCREASE RECIDIVISM
8 (2016), https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/wp-content/uploads/ITPI-Recidivism-ResearchBriefJune2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/VR53-HJKU] (explaining that recidivism rates have increased
due to private prison companies decreasing inmates’ amount of communication with friends and
family by replacing free in-person visitation with costly video visitation).
34. See id.; Eric Markowtiz, Prison-Tech Giant Securus Will No Longer Require Jails to
Remove In-Person Visits, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 6, 2015, 9:18 AM),
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with the goal of increasing the popularity of video calls, which would
allow the company—and the individual prisons, via commission—to
make more money through fees. “At last count, approximately 600
prisons in forty-six states have some version of a video visitation system,
and every year, more and more of those correctional facilities eliminate
in-person visitation entirely.”35 The privatization of prisons serves mainly
to benefit private corrections companies, and privatization thus harms
captive consumers.36 The fees attached to video visitation vary—and
higher fees give affluent inmates a greater advantage over inmates with
fewer financial resources—while in-person visitation carries virtually no
costs other than transportation and the minimal costs necessary to arrive
at the facility.37 This situation illustrates a classic compulsory contract:
Inmates must either accept the prisons’ terms and pay for video visitation
or forego visitation altogether.
Privatized prison services harm inmates in tangible ways. These
services present several types of consumer harm:
First, certain companies retain a virtual monopoly for these
services, which eliminates competitive bidding for contracts
and leads to extremely high pricing. Second, the high rates
charged by private contractors for deposits into trust
accounts and the use of prepaid debit cards are unfair—
appearing to be above the rates needed to ensure profit and
not subject to the same regulations intended to prevent such
abuses in other areas. Finally, a lack of viable alternatives
and the necessity of these services lead consumers to enter
into compulsory contracts to receive their own funds, forcing
them to accept the undesirable and unfair terms.38
In all, the private contracts between prison systems and private
vendors ultimately harm the consumers. These forced arrangements are
overinclusive: If inmates want any of the benefits, they are forced to fully
https://www.ibtimes.com/prison-tech-giant-securus-will-no-longer-require-jails-remove-personvisits-1910081 [https://perma.cc/3XZY-S3YK].
35. Appleman, supra note 18, at 605; see also Jack Smith, The End of Prison Visitation,
MIC (May 5, 2016), https://mic.com/articles/142779/the-end-of-prison-visitation#.67rjplgzz
[https://perma.cc/BMS6-8AJ5] (explaining that video visitation is replacing traditional in-person
visitation).
36. Appleman, supra note 18, at 606, 607.
37. But see id. at 609 (“Hawaii ships a full quarter of its convicted offenders out of state—
so many that [Corrections Corporation of America] has dedicated a special prison just for
Hawaiians in Arizona. . . . This out-of-state incarceration often severely curtails family visits, as
traveling over such great distances to see convicted family members costs both time and money.”
(footnote omitted)).
38. Catherine E. Akenhead, Note, How States Can Take a Stand Against Prison Banking
Profiteers, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1224, 1235 (2017) (footnotes omitted).
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participate in this relationship as defined by the prisons. Yet, these
agreements are also underprotective in that inmates come away from the
“deal” with no enforceable rights regarding the terms, services, charges,
or any breaches. Without privity, inmates face a barrier to litigation
because they cannot sue on their own behalves for any contractual
shortcomings. These arrangements may include agreeing to terms that
force inmates to pay absurd fees to access funds deposited into their bank
accounts, to talk to their families on the phone, and even to participate in
electronic media programs.
B. Commissary Within Prison Systems
The commissary system is a prisoner banking service that acts as an
automated teller machine between incarcerated individuals and their
“outside” contacts.39 The system allows “outside” individuals to use their
personal debit cards and money orders to deposit funds into separate
Inmate Trust Funds, which serve as special prison bank accounts for each
inmate.40 Inmates need access to funds within prison facilities because
they are often required to pay out of pocket for various expenses within
the prison, including items from commissary and, sometimes, rent and
meals.41 Further, inmates may have to pay criminal restitution,42 court
costs, child support, fines, and other expenses while incarcerated.43 As
such, access to money within prisons is a necessity, but the necessity
39. An individual may add money to an inmate trust account in three common ways. The
most common way an inmate receives money is from individuals outside of the prison, such as
friends and family. Id. at 1232. These individuals may deposit money into an inmate’s account
with their own personal debit cards. Id. Second, when the inmate is booked in the prison system,
the money he has on his person may be deposited into the account, so long as the money was not
earned via illegal activity. Id. Third, an inmate may deposit funds that the inmate earned from a
job within the prison; however, the pay for inmate jobs within prison facilities is typically very
low. Id.
40. See, e.g., Frequent Questions: Inmate Finances, S.D. DEP’T CORRECTIONS,
https://doc.sd.gov/about/faq/finances.aspx [http://perma.cc/5RN9-Q788]; Frequently Asked
Questions Regarding Inmate Funds, FLA. DEP’T CORRECTIONS, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/ci/
funds.html [https://perma.cc/RN6K-X95V].
41. See Akenhead, supra note 38, at 1231–32.
42. Criminal “restitution” is not the same as classic restitution; criminal restitution is simply
an amount that a criminal defendant must pay to compensate the victim of the defendant’s crime.
See DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 370 n.4 (“Judges and lawyers sometimes speak of a
convicted criminal’s duty to make restitution to his victim as a condition of probation or other
leniency in the sentence. Restitution in this sense often only means compensation for actual losses
suffered by the criminal’s victim, not necessarily a restoration of gains received, although the two
may equate to the same thing in many instances.”); Akenhead, supra note 38, at 1231–32. See
generally Cortney E. Lollar, What Is Criminal Restitution, 100 IOWA L. REV. 93 (2014)
(discussing criminal restitution).
43. See Kirsten D. Levingston & Vicki Turetsky, Debtors’ Prison—Prisoners’
Accumulation of Debt as a Barrier to Reentry, 41 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 187, 188–91 (2007).
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comes at the expense of the outside contacts who deposit the money into
the inmates’ accounts.
Before the electronic system was as widely used as it is today, inmates
primarily received money orders via mail.44 As criminal justice scholar
Laura Appleman has explained, “[a]lthough companies like JPay claim
to streamline the provision of money from families to inmates, they have
actually replaced the simplicity of sending money orders with a system
which charges high user fees per transaction to deposit money via a debit
card.”45 The fees attached to depositing money into one’s Inmate Trust
Fund can be crippling,46 and though it may seem like the private
companies are tacking on these fees solely for their own benefit,
“[c]orrection facilities benefit from privatized banking as well.”47 The
obstacles associated with accessing money within prisons present another
method by which prisons and private companies benefit at the expense of
inmates and their families.
C. Personal Property Regulations in Florida Department of
Corrections Sites
Before exploring issues specific to Florida prisons, it is important to
note that the Florida Administrative Code regulates inmate property in
the state.48 Appendix One (“Property List”) of the Code indicates the
quantities of personal items authorized within the FDC’s prison
facilities.49 The Property List provides that each inmate may possess one
media player, one media player armband holder, one set of earbuds, and
one pair of replacement earbud pads.50 Thus, inmates may only have one
media player at a time. When prison facilities choose to contract with new
media companies, consumers must sacrifice their old media players to
participate in the new media programs.51 The “choice” is either to be left
44. Akenhead, supra note 38, at 1231.
45. Appleman, supra note 18, at 602.
46. See id. (“JPay . . . has charged fees as high as forty-five percent to place money in an
account . . . . The choice is to pay the fees or go without [any money].” (footnote omitted)).
47. Id. at 602–03 (“[F]or every payment sent to a prisoner (usually at least one transfer per
prisoner per month) the company remits between $.50 and $2.50 back to the facility.”); see also
Dina Gusovsky, The Big Business of Selling Apps to Prison Inmates, CNBC (Oct. 1, 2014, 12:21
PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/10/01/the-big-business-of-selling-apps-to-prison-inmates.html
[https://perma.cc/W7ZK-G88W] (stating that JPay charges anywhere between $1.45 and $24.95
per transfer).
48. See generally FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 33-602.201 (2019).
49. See id. app.
50. See id.
51. Some may argue that such a sacrifice constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In fact, Florida inmates filed a class action lawsuit
on February 19, 2019, alleging that the taking of their media files without just compensation
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behind with no access, or to surrender prior media with all its contents to
enjoy the new media. Most prisoners choose the latter. But participation
in a new media program is governed by whatever terms and rates the
prison and the private company have established.
II. DEAL OR NO DEAL: THE PROFIT-CENTERED APPROACH TO
NEGOTIATING CONTRACTS
“It’s like the more money we come across,
the more problems we see.”52
In Florida, private companies have provided inmate benefits for profit
for over a decade.53 Companies’ contracts with the prison system vary in
some ways—for example, whether commissions are deposited into the
State’s General Revenue Fund directly or deposited elsewhere54—but the
contracts consistently allow the system to hold inmates and families at its
mercy, with widespread implications on the economy, the general
welfare, and the justice system.
A. The Florida Department of Corrections and Keefe
Commissary Network
The Keefe Group earns a profit from soliciting its services to jail and
prison facilities.55 The company is comprised of six smaller operating
companies: Keefe Supply Company, Keefe Commissary Network,
Access Securepak, Access Corrections, ICSolutions, and Advanced
Technologies Group.56 The Keefe Commissary Network (KCN) and
Access Corrections (Access) are of particular importance to this Note.
KCN is an automated-commissary-management service and technology

constitutes a constitutional taking. See Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory
Relief at 18–19, 21–23, Demler v. Inch, No. 4:19-cv-00094-MW-CAS (N.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2019)
(“Through the implementation of the Multimedia Tablet Program, Defendant FDOC has violated
the Takings Clause by taking the private property of prisoners who purchased digital media files
without just compensation.”). However, this constitutional theory of inmate injury is beyond the
scope of this Note.
52. THE NOTORIOUS B.I.G., MO’ MONEY MO’ PROBLEMS (Bad Boy Entertainment & Arista
Records 1997).
53. See, e.g., Keefe Contract, supra note 7, § I.A. (executing the original contract on Mar.
29, 2009).
54. See Conarck, supra note 11 (“In the Access Corrections contract, revenue left over after
paying to run the program went back in a general fund controlled by the Legislature. But in the
JPay contract, the Department retains any excess revenue in its administrative trust fund.”).
55. See About Keefe Group, KEEFE GROUP, https://www.keefegroup.com/home-100
[https://perma.cc/3A4N-9SBR].
56. Id.
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company,57 while Access is a company that focuses on providing media
and communication services within the prison industry.58
The Keefe Group started exploring inmate benefits as a profitable
enterprise a decade ago. On March 29, 2009, the FDC and KCN entered
into an initial contract to provide “statewide canteen services” in state
prisons throughout Florida.59 The FDC established a fixed-price menu for
the items on the canteen product list.60 The contract explicitly provided
that the “[p]rices shall not exceed the fair market prices.”61 Each sale was
subject to sales tax.62
Under the contract, KCN was required to pay the FDC a commission
of the total sales.63 The commission rates were as follows: “Regardless
of the amount of gross sales, [Keefe] will compensate the Department in
an amount of $0.96 per day per inmate based on the Department’s
Average Daily Population. . . . Compensation shall be paid for each
calendar day of each contractual year.”64 The Master Canteen Products
List (June 2011) provided the following inmate menu categories: tobacco
and accessories, toiletries, sundry, health aids, personal property, drinks,
candy, cookies/snacks, frozen entrees, condiments, postage, male only
products, female only products, and other miscellaneous products.65 The
contract is silent on commission from individual sales. The full-service
canteen operations ceased on January 23, 2015.66
The canteen services are only an example of KCN’s first foray into
gleaning profits from a captive market. This business model may have
become more sophisticated over time as it branched out to sell other
products, such as music and entertainment devices, to inmate consumers.

57. See Keefe Commissary Network, KEEFE GROUP, https://www.keefegroup.com/
companies/keefe-commissary-network-112 [https://perma.cc/2Q3M-EU97].
58. See Access Corrections, supra note 6.
59. Keefe Contract, supra note 7, §§ I.A, II.A.
60. See id. § II.I.1; id. attachment A.
61. See id. § II.I.1. Further, regarding price alterations, the Keefe Contract states:
The request for price increases must include written justification for the
increase. The requested increase shall not exceed ten percent (10%) of the thencurrent selling price of the item for which a price increase is sought. Any price
increase that results in the price of a product exceeding the fair market price will
be denied, regardless of the percentage of increase requested.
Id.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See id. §§ II.L.4, II.Q.
See id. § III.A.1.
See id.
See id. amend. 1, attachment 1.
See id. amend. 4, ¶ 2.
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In July 2011, KCN and the FDC amended the contract to include a
plan for implementing the MP3 Player Program.67 The program equipped
FDC facilities with kiosks from which inmates could purchase MP3
players, songs, and accessories.68 KCN was “acknowledged to be the
owner of all equipment associated with the operation of [the] program.”69
The contract expressly stated that “[t]he [media] player shall have the
ability to be unlocked upon release of the inmate for continued use for a
one-time fee paid by the released inmate to [Keefe].”70
Inmates in general population and special housing units, including
Death Row, Infirmary, Transitional Care Units, and Crisis Stabilization
Units, could participate in the MP3 Player Program.71 Only inmates in
Disciplinary Confinement did not receive the benefits of this program.72
This means that every inmate, as long as the inmate exhibited “good
behavior” and could financially afford the associated costs, was allowed
to participate in and benefit from the MP3 Player Program. More inmates
participating in the program equated to more revenue for both the FDC
and KCN because both entities received a profit from the sales.
Similar to the canteen service, inmates could purchase an MP3 player,
songs, and accessories via funds from their Inmate Trust Funds.73 The
Master Canteen Products List records the following prices: (1) MP3
Player, 8G: $119.95; (2) MP3 Player, 4G: $99.95; (3) Armband: $15.00;
(4) Protective Cover: $6.00; (5) Earbuds: $16.00; (6) Song Credits, 1
Credit (5 Songs): $8.50.74 To purchase a song, an inmate had to purchase
at least one song credit—and thus five songs—at a time; each individual
song was therefore valued at $1.70.75
The Access Contract provided for the FDC’s commission per sale.76
The commission rates for the MP3 Player Program sales were as follows:
(1) $0.20 per downloaded song; (2) $2.00 per armband; (3) $1.00 per
earbud; and (4) $1.00 per protective cover.77 Per the contract, “[p]ursuant
to Section 945.215, Florida Statutes, the Department must deposit the net
proceeds from the guaranteed per diem payment into the State’s General

67. See id. amend. 1, ¶ 1.
68. See id. amend. 1, ¶ 6.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. Id. amend. 1, ¶ 7.
72. See id.
73. See id. § II.X; id. amend. 1, ¶ 6. For a discussion of Inmate Trust Fund accounts, see
supra Section I.B.
74. See Keefe Contract, supra note 7, amend. 1, attachment 1.
75. See id.
76. See id. amend. 1, ¶ 16.
77. See id.
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Revenue fund.”78 In other words, the excess money generated from the
Access Contract benefited the state as a whole, rather than the prison
system. This approach, though still profit-centered in nature, allowed
Florida citizens to receive benefits from inmate purchases. Instead of
focusing solely on how the captive market could enrich the prisons, the
contract allowed enrichments to flow beyond prison walls and into the
Sunshine State. In other words, if these benefits are in any part unjust,
both the prisons and the state are recipients of unjust gains.
B. The Florida Department of Corrections and JPay
Securus Technologies, an inmate-communication servicer,79 owns
JPay,80 which describes itself as “not a commissary company nor . . . an
inmate telephone company. We are a software company focused on
building and delivering innovative inmate service applications.”81 In
short, JPay is an electronic-money-transfer and telecommunications
service for inmates.
The FDC and JPay entered into a contract on April 17, 2017.82 Under
the contract, JPay will provide multimedia kiosks and tablets for inmates’
use.83 “[I]nmates can use [the kiosks] to purchase tablets preloaded with
a variety of educational and entertainment content. Inmates can also
browse and purchase additional content for these tablets, including music,
games, news, and eBooks.”84 Similar to the Access players,85 inmates

78. See id. § II.F.5. Section 945.215(1)(d) of the Florida Statutes reads:
All proceeds from the following sources must be deposited in the General
Revenue Fund: 1. The confiscation and liquidation of any contraband found
upon, or in the possession of, any inmate; 2. Disciplinary fines imposed against
inmates; 3. Forfeitures of inmate earnings; and 4. Unexpended balances in
individual inmate trust fund accounts of less than $1.
FLA. STAT. § 945.215(1)(d) (2018).
79. See About Us, SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, https://securustech.net/web/securus/about-us
[https://perma.cc/C7Y9-7FEB]. For a discussion of Securus’s sketchy business tactics, see notes
28–36 and accompanying text.
80. See About JPay, JPAY, https://www.JPay.com/AboutUs.aspx [https://perma.cc/C7Y97FEB].
81. JPAY, INC., REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL NO. 1901: TECHNICAL PROPOSAL 5 (2011),
https://static.prisonpolicy.org/scans/cards/RFP_1901_JPay_Technical_Proposal.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4DRK-KQBB] (proposing a solution to Nevada for the implementation of inmate
kiosks).
82. See JPay Contract, supra note 8, § I.A.
83. Id. § II.A.
84. Id.
85. See Keefe Contract, supra note 7, amend. 1, ¶ 6.
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may unlock and take home the JPay tablets once an inmate completes his
prison sentence.86
Inmates can purchase additional content through JPay Media
Accounts.87 Each prepaid account is linked to the inmate’s tablet,
transaction history, and Inmate Trust Fund account.88 The FDC has opted
to have the JPay Media Account and Inmate Trust Fund linked—as
opposed to operating as separate financial wallets—to “ensur[e] that
inmates are not able to place funds in their JPay Media Account as a way
to circumvent paying debts owed to the [FDC].”89 Simply put, the FDC
can control how inmates use their personal funds. The JPay Media
Accounts function like traditional commissary accounts in that inmates
may load money onto the accounts and check their account balances.90
Unlike Access’s fixed price list, the JPay prices vary.91 Under the JPay
Program, inmates can purchase individual songs rather than having to buy
five songs at a time as they did under the Access Program.92 JPay’s Fee
Structure indicates the following prices: (1) JP5mini Tablet: $79.99; (2)
JP5S Tablet: $129.99; (3) Replacement Earbuds: $10.00; (4) Armband:
$10.00; (5) Songs: $1.00–$2.50.93 The JPay Contract brings attention to
the inmates who previously owned Access players. It states:
Once [JPay] receives a list of inmates who own [Access]
players, a 60-day promotional period will begin in which
[JPay] will, via the kiosk, enable inmates who own a[n
Access] player to obtain a free JP5mini or purchase a JP5S
7” player for $50. Inmates who own a[n Access] player will
also receive a $10 media credit within two (2) weeks of
placing their player order.94
The FDC fully implemented the JPay Program on January 23, 2019—
the date on which the FDC removed the inmates’ Access MP3 Players.95
Similar to the Access Contract, the JPay Contract provides a commission
scale under which private Florida prison facilities shall be compensated
86. See JPay Contract, supra note 8, § II.F.3.
87. See id. § II.F.8.g.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id. § II.F.2.
91. Compare Keefe Contract, supra note 7, amend. 1, attachment 1 (demonstrating fixed
prices for certain items), with JPay Contract, supra note 8, attachment A (demonstrating that
prices may vary).
92. See JPay Contract, supra note 8, attachment A.
93. See id.; see also id. § II.F.17 (“[JPay] will offer tablets . . . at 50% off for a 60-day
promotional period. After the promotional period, all inmates will purchase their tablet and
applications in accordance with the fee structure outlined in ATTACHMENT A.”).
94. Id. § II.F.17.
95. See Conarck, supra note 11.
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for all inmate purchases, excluding the tablet device itself.96 The
generated commission is deposited into the “Privately-Operated
Institutions Inmate Welfare Trust Fund” (PWTF).97 Additionally, the
contract provides for “Value-Added Services,” including video relay
service, educational tablets, communications monitoring, personal
computer refresh, officer station iPads, network bandwidth
sharing/MDM, additional network installations, phone time purchases,
connectivity for special housing units, friends and family email blasts, an
electronic survey system, complementary content, and a law library.98
The JPay Contract provides a higher quantity, and perhaps quality, of
benefits to the prison facilities than the Access Contract provided. Under
the JPay Contract, the prison facilities became equipped with more
advanced technology to monitor inmate behavior, enhance
communication between inmates and their loved ones through the use of
email and video visitations, and provide inmates with various forms of
entertainment—as opposed to merely relying on physical copies of books
located in the prison libraries. The Access Contract seemingly did not
provide any benefits to prison facilities outside of the commission derived
from sales to the inmates; instead, the majority of the benefits that
inmates received under the Access Contract were aimed at providing
inmates with musical entertainment options. The FDC’s benefit-centered
approach in its transition to the JPay Contract reveals the prisons’ motive:
to derive the maximum amount of possible benefits from the contract.
The transition does not appear to consider the losses and expenses
incurred by inmates and their families.
C. The Impact of the Transition of Privity from Access Corrections
to JPay
The JPay Contract stands to benefit the FDC and, in some ways,
Florida inmates. In other ways, however, the program stands to injure
inmates and potentially Florida citizens. Both the benefits and downfalls
stem from the elimination of inmates’ music files purchased through the
Access Program, the likelihood of double compensation for the FDC
through the inmates’ repurchasing those files, and the change in
destination of the excess funds from Florida’s General Revenue Fund to
the PWTF.
96. See JPay Contract, supra note 8, amend. 1, ¶ 7 (“[I]n exchange for the provision of these
services, [JPay] shall provide payment to the [FDC] of all commissions and fees . . . at the
[following] rates . . . Fifteen percent (15%) commission on all purchases made by inmates at
Private Prisons and Customer purchases related to inmates in Private Prisons (this excludes the
cost of the tablets themselves).”).
97. See id.
98. See id. § II.F.18.
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1. Impact on the Florida Department of Corrections
Under the JPay Contract, private prisons will receive a second round
of commission for any music files an inmate repurchases. 99 Every
participating prison facility will receive value-added services as benefits
of the contract as well as any revenue placed in the PWTF.100 The excess
money placed in the PWTF may be invested directly into the prison itself,
whereas the General Revenue Fund of the state serves to benefit Florida
citizens as a whole.101
If the prisons received commission only from the initial contract, their
profits would arguably be harmless. However, the JPay commission
model is designed to be cumulative: Commission earned on song
repurchases is counted in addition to the commission earned on initial
purchases under the Access Program. In this sense, prisons can profit
each time that they decide to enter a new contract with a new company,
and since no one appears to be representing the inmates’ interests during
these renegotiations, inmates are bound to lose something—tangible or
not—during each transition. These contracts are executed with the
conscious objective of maximizing profits for the prisons with little
regard for the vulnerable position in which inmates are placed.
2. Impact on Florida Inmates
As a result of the transition from the Access Contract to the JPay
Contract, an inmate must sacrifice his MP3 player, regardless of whether
that inmate wishes to participate in the JPay Tablet Program. This loss is
“remedied” by replacing the inmate’s MP3 player with a JPay tablet and
providing a $10 store credit.102 Facially, this may seem just, but more
issues arise. For instance, a $10 store credit only accounts for
approximately five of the songs that an inmate purchased during Access’s
tenure. It disregards the amount of money that an inmate spent building
his music library over the last seven years. It also disregards the
additional expenses that an inmate must incur to repurchase the files that
he lost during the transition. This means a windfall for the prisons each
time that a prisoner must restart his music library.
The effects of these incursions reverberate beyond the prison walls.
Inmates mainly rely on friends and family outside of the prison as their
99. Id. amend. 1, at ¶ 7.
100. See id. § II.F.18; id. amend. 1, ¶ 7.
101. See Conarck, supra note 11 (“In the Access Corrections contract, revenue left over after
paying to run the program went back in a general fund controlled by the Legislature. But in the
JPay contract, the Department retains any excess revenue in its administrative trust fund.”); see
also JPay Contract, supra note 8, § II.F.18 (discussing the value-added services); id. amend. 1, ¶
7 (discussing private prison commissions).
102. See JPay Contract, supra note 8, § II.F.17.
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primary source of income.103 This may cause financial hardship for an
inmate’s family struggling to replace old song files. If it were feasible for
the inmates to repurchase every song that they previously owned through
the Access Program, the FDC would receive double the commissions
since the prisons have already been compensated once for the sales.104
What is more, nothing limits the number of times that the prisons may
pull this transition. Thus, the erasure of files amounts to more profit for
prisons, and in this case, it may amount to a second payout to the prisons.
On the other hand, the JPay Contract provides some benefits to
inmates, including video visitation capabilities.105 Video visitation may
offer inmates more flexibility to see and speak with loved ones. For
inmates incarcerated out of state, the costs and fees associated with the
video visitations may offset transportation costs and be more convenient
for their families. The tablet program also gives inmates access to more
entertainment options than just music files.106 Now, inmates may
purchase and download games and e-books onto their tablets.107 This
expansion of entertainment options may result in increased educational
opportunities for Florida inmates.
3. Impact on Florida Citizens
Although they are only indirectly affected by the transition in
contracts, Florida citizens also have a stake in the contract change.
Florida citizens are primarily affected by the excess funds no longer
going into the State’s General Revenue Fund and instead only benefitting
the prisons.108 Arguably, these excess funds could be used for the general
welfare; however, the FDC is now permitted to put that money back into
the prison facilities even after receiving the value-added benefits and
commission provided to them by the JPay Contract.109 The lack of
transparency in the process renders it difficult to capture the nature and
scope of implications for the citizenry. Accordingly, this Note maintains
its focus on the more directly affected constituency: the inmates.
Nonetheless, the theory of unjust enrichment proposed as a solution for
inmates could potentially extend to cover a citizen-based interest should
the facts ultimately warrant it.110
103. See supra discussion Section I.B.
104. See Keefe Contract, supra note 7, amend. 1, ¶ 16.
105. See JPay Contract, supra note 8, §§ II.F.3.a, II.F.10.
106. See id. § II.F.8.
107. See id. § II.F.8.b, .d.
108. See id. amend. 1, ¶ 7.
109. Cf. id. (explaining that money will go directly into a privately owned trust fund).
110. It is also true that the state likely sits as a fiduciary to both the inmates and the public at
large. For such a claim, the burden of proof is higher and exceptions broader. For those reasons,
this Note centers on the overlooked, but more elegant, path of unjust enrichment.
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III. THE LAST LAUGH: BREAKING THE CHAINS OF PRIVITY IN PRIVATE
LAW REMEDIES
“[L]aw and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice
and . . . when they fail in this purpose they become the dangerously
structured dams that block the flow of social progress.”111
Contracts lie at the heart of this controversy. Yet, neither contract law
nor its remedies will solve this problem. The following Section explains
how contract law fails to afford Florida inmates an opportunity to sue on
their own behalves as nonparties to contracts. Though traditional contract
law may leave both inmates and the public voiceless, restitution and
unjust enrichment may provide a voice to those without judicial standing
in other areas of substantive law such as tort, property, and contract law.
A. Contract Law and Third-Party Beneficiaries
Generally, one must have privity to sue based on a contract.112 There
is an explicit exception to this requirement, however, for intentional thirdparty beneficiaries.113 When a third party incidentally benefits from a
contract, no privity arises and he cannot sue.114 When a contract provides
for the benefit of a third party, however, this intentional benefit functions
as a proxy for privity—the intentional third-party beneficiary can sue,
even as a nonparty.115
The third-party-beneficiary doctrine is easily illustrated by a concrete
example. Consider Lee, a homeowner who enjoys looking at his neighbor
Ben’s lawn. Ben contracts with a local landscaping company, so his lawn
is nice to look at. If either Ben or the landscaping company breaches their
contract, Lee likely does not have standing to sue—he is not a party to
the contract and the benefit that he derives from the contract (his nice
view and increased property value) is merely incidental. However, if Lee

111. Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr., to Clergymen (Apr. 16, 1963) (“Letter from a
Birmingham
Jail”),
https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html
[https://perma.cc/CYW6-98NS].
112. See Privity of Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
113. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts: The Contractual Governance of
Virtual Worlds, 53 MCGILL L.J. 427, 453 (2008) (“Third-party-beneficiary clauses require that the
beneficiary be the intended, not just the incidental, beneficiary of a contractual promise.”).
114. See Michael Risch, Virtual Third Parties, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 415, 418 (2009) (“[T]he [third-party-beneficiary] doctrine only protects non-parties who are
intended to benefit from the contract . . . . The “intention” threshold for such an extra-contractual
action is strict; the contracting parties must intentionally bestow something of value, an
affirmative benefit, or even a savings, on the third party.” (footnotes omitted)).
115. See id. at 419 (“[I]f the [intention] threshold is surpassed, then the [third-party
beneficiary] can sue the breaching party even if the other contracting party will not.”).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss1/4

20

Howard: Unjustly Enriched Prisons: The Problem with Capitalizing on Capti

UNJUSTLY ENRICHED PRISONS

2020]

147

can prove that his nice view and increased property value were intentional
benefits of the contract, Lee may sue the breaching party himself.
This doctrine may be triggered whenever a nonparty to a contract is
affected, allowing nonparties to exercise “rights that might otherwise be
ignored by the contracting parties.”116 In these situations, the third party
is allowed to step into the shoes of a contracting party and sue another
party for breach.117
In the prison-servicer contracts, Florida inmates and citizens are
nonparties to the contract.118 And unfortunately, the contracts explicitly
erase any possibility of intended third-party beneficiaries through a
provision denoting that they did not intend to create beneficiaries.119 Both
the Access and JPay Contracts include the following provision: “Except
as otherwise expressly provided herein, neither this Contract, nor any
amendment, addendum or exhibit attached hereto, nor term, provision or
clause contained therein, shall be construed as being for the benefit of, or
providing a benefit to, any party not a signatory hereto.”120 As such,
neither Florida inmates nor Florida citizens have standing to sue under
traditional contract law. The third-party-beneficiary doctrine may only be
invoked when the nonparty is an “intended” beneficiary, rather than an
“incidental” beneficiary.121
Because the inmates are incidental by definition, they cannot sue as
nonparties. Theoretically, the inmates could sue for status
reconceptualization—they are arguably intended to be beneficiaries of
the contract. While a neighbor might enter into a lawn care contract
without any regard for who would be impacted, it can be argued that the
FDC entered into a contract with Access with the full knowledge that
inmates would be both impacted and benefitted as nonparties. Without
the inmates, the contract would not exist. The prison only benefits from
116. See id. at 425.
117. See id. at 416–17.
118. See, e.g., Keefe Contract, supra note 7 (“This Contract is between the Florida
Department of Corrections . . . and the Keefe Commissary Network, LLC . . . .”).
119. See JPay Contract, supra note 8, § VII.Z; Keefe Contract, supra note 7, § IV.Z.
120. JPay Contract, supra note 8, § VII.Z.; Keefe Contract, supra note 7, § IV.Z.
121. Risch, supra note 114, at 418–19.
Receipt of benefits by the third party does not end the inquiry; the [thirdparty-beneficiary] doctrine only protects non-parties who are intended to benefit
from the contract. Only then may a third party sue for a contractual breach despite
not being a party to the agreement. The “intention” threshold for such an extracontractual action is strict; the contracting parties must intentionally bestow
something of value, an affirmative benefit, or even a savings, on the third party.
The third party cannot be a remote or an “incidental” beneficiary.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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the Access Contract if the inmates, as nonparties to the contract,
participate in the Access Program. If inmates do not purchase MP3
players or music, the FDC does not receive any derived benefit
(commission) from Access. The same is true for the JPay Contract.
The inmates, as a narrow class of beneficiaries, are the only consumers
from whom a prison’s commission derives. Unlike a neighbor who enjoys
a nice view, the inmates are contemplated, intended beneficiaries and are
not merely incidental to the contracts. The inmates are also an identifiable
group of consumers who directly benefit from the contracts. Unlike in the
lawn care hypothetical, where any passerby could be considered an
incidental beneficiary, the general inmate population of these prison
facilities is readily discernable. Further, inmates who purchase the
products available to them per the contracts are an even narrower
identifiable class. This analogy reveals a discrepancy inherent in the
inmates’ currently defined status as incidental beneficiaries.
The FDC has consciously eliminated any rights that inmates may have
had under the contracts, even if the private media companies—as
opposed to the prisons themselves—breach the contracts. This express
elimination of beneficiaries displays a conscious effort to take advantage
of inmate vulnerability because, without any standing under traditional
contract law, the inmates must apparently tolerate any contract-related
injustices that come their way.
However, even if the inmates were labeled intended third-party
beneficiaries, damages may be hard to show and limited to out-of-pocket
reliance costs or other causal losses.122 Further, this status would only put
the inmates in privity for the purposes of a lawsuit if an actual party
breached the contract.123 The inmates would still be unable to sue a prison
for any wrong the prison committed against them because neither party
breached the contract. Thus, the contract route may be flawed regardless
of the inmates’ status as intended or incidental third-party beneficiaries
since the evidence fails to demonstrate a typical breach of contract.
If a court considers the inmates as third-party beneficiaries under any
such contracts, inmates’ lawyers would be wise to consider whether an
opportunistic-breach-of-contract claim124 might help characterize the
122. See generally David M. Summers, Note, Third Party Beneficiaries and the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 880 (1982) (explaining the theoretical basis for thirdparty recovery under the third-party-beneficiary doctrine).
123. See Risch, supra note 114, at 416–17.
124. An opportunistic-breach-of-contract claim is also novel and grounds itself in unjust
enrichment law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND RESTITUTION § 39 cmt.
a (AM. Law INST. 2011). An opportunistic breach of contract arises when one of the contracting
parties breaches the contract for a bigger, better deal with another party. See generally Caprice L.
Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement as a Moral Compass for Breach of Contract, 77 U. CIN. L.
REV. 991 (2009) (discussing the application of the opportunistic-breach-of-contract doctrine).
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wrongdoing more properly. Such a theory connects contract law to unjust
enrichment through a powerful restitution remedy of profit disgorgement
to undo unjust enrichment.125 The following Section presents the most
viable theory—a freestanding theory of unjust enrichment. Freestanding
means that no contract rights or breach of contract is necessary.126 Unjust
enrichment alone could be the ideal cause of action and the best remedy
to deter the state and prevent unjust enrichment at the inmates’ expense.
B. Unjust Enrichment and Restitution
Restitution, put simply, means restoration.127 The seminal remedies
treatise defines restitution as “a return or restoration of what defendant
has gained in a transaction. It may be a return of a specific thing or it may
be a ‘return’ of a money substitute for that thing.”128 Restitution provides
both “a substantive basis to sue as well as a host of formidable
remedies.”129 Such remedies may be sought as a result of a freestanding
unjust enrichment cause of action or as a “piggyback” remedy for tort,
contract, or property law causes of action.130 The purpose of restitution is
to prevent a defendant’s unjust enrichment by restoring any gains or
benefits where it would be unjust for the defendant to retain them in the
absence of restoration.131
In contrast to other substantive areas of law, which offer
compensatory damages to restore the plaintiff to his rightful position,
unjust enrichment and restitution focus on the defendant’s gains, not the
plaintiff’s losses.132 As such, restitutionary recovery may sometimes
prove to be more desirable for plaintiffs than damages. For example,
125. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND RESTITUTION § 39 cmt. c (AM.
LAW INST. 2011). For an exploration of the nature of unjust enrichment, see infra Section III.B.
Here, if the FDC would have breached the Keefe Contract for a bigger, better deal with JPay, the
inmates—if classified as intended third-party beneficiaries—could seek the disgorgement of any
profits FDC has retained or will retain as a result of the new contract.
126. See DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 380.
127. Id. at 370.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. e(3)
(AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“[T]he remedy of restitution is a device available in appropriate
circumstances—as an alternative to damages—to enforce obligations derived from torts,
contracts, and other topics of substantive law.”).
131. See DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 370.
132. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. d (AM. LAW
INST. 2011) (“The law of torts identifies those circumstances in which a person is liable for injury
inflicted, measuring liability by the extent of the harm; the law of restitution identifies those
circumstances in which a person is liable for the benefits received, measuring liability by the
extent of the benefit.”); ANDREW KULL & WARD FARNSWORTH, RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT: CASES AND NOTES 1 (2018) (“[The law of tort] awards damages to victims of wrongs
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[s]uppose defendant steals plaintiff’s watch, the value of
which was admittedly only $30. Defendant is able to sell the
watch for more than its value, say $40. Plaintiff’s loss is a
watch valued at $30 and his damages recovery measured by
loss is $30. The goal is compensatory. But defendant’s gain
is $40 and plaintiff’s restitutionary recovery measured by
that gain is $40. In this example, defendant is unjustly
enriched, and plaintiff is entitled to restitution. Not all
restitution is in money. The watch example shows, however,
that when restitution is made in money, the restitution
remedy can yield results quite different from the money
remedy called damages.133
Thus, plaintiffs may elect restitutionary recovery when their recovery
would exceed the recovery allowed by typical compensatory damages.134
Notably, restitution is neither compensatory nor punitive in nature.135
An unjust enrichment claim may be brought without the requirement
of an underlying tort, contract, or property claim.136 The most common
example of freestanding restitution is a mistaken bank transfer.137
Professor Doug Rendleman offers the following hypothetical:
[A] misaimed First Bank computer fires . . . money into
Sarah’s checking account, no gift to Sarah was intended, no
contract between the two was breached, no conversion or
other tort occurred, and no property right was infringed. But

to compensate them for their losses. . . . The law of restitution takes the opposite approach. It is
focused on gain-based recovery—that is, on lawsuits in which the plaintiff seeks to take away
gains that the defendant should not have made, rather than obtaining compensation for losses that
the plaintiff should not have suffered.”).
133. See DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 370 (footnote omitted).
134. Where punitive damages are desired, a plaintiff must carefully consider her options and
proceed with a demand for damages.
135. See Doug Rendleman, Measurement of Restitution: Coordinating Restitution with
Compensatory Damages and Punitive Damages, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973, 980 (2011).
136. See KULL & FARNSWORTH, supra note 132, at 1 (“But there are also many important
situations in which a suit to take away a defendant’s gains can solve problems that are not reached
by any other body of law at all.”); Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1191,
1192 (1995) (“In some cases, a theory of unjust enrichment provides the only available
explanation of why the defendant is liable at all.”); Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance
of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1284 (1989) (“Defendant may be unjustly enriched without
having committed any other civil wrong.”); Caprice L. Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement for
Opportunistic Breach of Contract and Mitigation of Damages, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 131, 136
(2008) (“[M]any cases arise under freestanding restitution or unjust enrichment claims, i.e., the
plaintiff does not need an underlying contract, tort, or property claim.”).
137. DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES CASES & MATERIALS 517 (3d ed.
2018).
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the money unjustly enriches Sarah, and surprise!, surprise!,
she cannot keep it.138
In the hypothetical, Sarah earned a benefit (money into her checking
account) at the expense of the plaintiff (because the plaintiff lost money),
which unjustly enriched Sarah (because there was no gratuitous or other
intent behind the transfer). Thus, Sarah is obligated to return the money.
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment explains
that “[t]he benefit that is the basis of a restitution claim may take any
form, direct or indirect.”139 This benefit may come in the form of property
as well as goods and services.140 Liability in restitution for receipt of a
benefit may be determined by a variety of factors,141 which may include:
“(1) the plaintiff conferred a benefit upon the defendant; (2) the defendant
had an appreciation or knowledge of the benefit; and (3) the defendant
accepted or retained the benefit under circumstances making it
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment of its
value.”142 Intangible benefits, such as services rendered, may be difficult
to measure since the law of restitution is more concerned with the
reasonable value of those services.143
Determining whether an enrichment is “unjust” is the essential
inquiry.144 Kull notes, “The central problem of the law of restitution is to
identify those instances of enrichment that the law regards as unjust; in
other words, to distinguish benefits that have to be paid for from those

138. Id.
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. c (AM. LAW
INST. 2011) (emphasis omitted).
140. See id. § 1 cmt. d.
141. See id.
142. Id. The Restatement further explains that the factors may be unhelpful:
The third element of the foregoing list, referring to “circumstances making it
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit,” incorporates the whole of the
question presented, making the rest of the formula superfluous. The second
element, the defendant’s “appreciation or knowledge of the benefit,” is both
mysterious and potentially mischievous. If the requirement is taken to mean that
a defendant cannot be liable in restitution for benefits of which the defendant was
unaware—or for benefits that the defendant attempted to refuse—it is plainly
incorrect. If it refers to defensive limitations on a liability based on unjust
enrichment, it is both redundant (in light of the third element) and an awkward
summary of several features of the law of restitution that protect the defendant’s
economic liberty.
Id.

143. See Roberts, supra note 124, at 1016.
144. Kull, supra note 136, at 1226.
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that we can retain without payment.”145 The law of unjust enrichment
recognizes that benefits conferred by volunteers and officious
intermeddlers are benefits that may be justly retained without payment.146
Kull continues:
[T]he problem of identifying unjust enrichment subsumes
the other characteristic difficulties of the subject. These
include the problem of measuring a restitutionary recovery
(how much of this benefit, in the hands of this defendant,
constitutes unjust enrichment?), as well as the defenses to
restitution (are there additional circumstances, such as
change of position or bona fide purchase, making it
inappropriate to conclude that this defendant has been
unjustly enriched?).147
Here, the unjust enrichment arises when prisons require inmates to
forfeit their media players and music files,148 as well as purchase new
song files to build their music libraries, to participate in a new program.
The initial benefits (commission) from the Access Contract constitute
benefits that may be justly retained without repayment; that is, because
the inmates voluntarily participated in the media program and the prisons
directly benefited from their participation through commission awarded
to them by Access, there is arguably no issue with this scenario. However,
the scenario becomes muddied when inmates have to pay, a second time,
for the same benefit they had already received, and prisons benefit, a
second time, through value-added services to the prison facilities and
commissions. This enrichment comes at the expense of the inmates, their
families, and the public because (1) the inmates and their families must
use their own personal funds to repurchase and restore the music libraries;
(2) the inmates must “surrender” their media players; and (3) the public
loses the benefit of having the excess funds deposited into the State
General Revenue fund, which is used to benefit the state as a whole.
The situation currently unfolding in Florida most resembles a
freestanding unjust enrichment cause of action. The benefit to the inmates
(media and music files)149 is more like goods than services because the
inmates are not actually conducting or completing any action upon which
the prisons are profiting. Traditional unjust enrichment takes the
145. Id.
146. Laycock, supra note 136, at 1284; see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 112
(AM. LAW INST. 1937) (“[A] person is entitled to restitution for a benefit conferred as the result of
mistake[,] including fraud . . . or of coercion, whether caused by duress or the necessity of
protecting the transferor’s interests . . . or of an agreement by the transferee . . . .”).
147. Kull, supra note 136, at 1226.
148. The “surrender” of inmates’ MP3 players, which are designed for a particular use within
prison facilities, may also constitute a form of conversion.
149. Though the music files are intangible, “goods” still seems to be the appropriate label.
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approach that the prisons would have to “give back” the unjustly retained
benefit, but here, that approach is imperfect because the prisons have
nothing tangible to “give back” to the inmates, other than the initial
expenses that the inmates incurred to purchase the media players and
song files. Further, the prisons have not received a benefit that the inmates
should have retained, but the prisons arguably have the potential to
receive a benefit that the public should have received—the excess funds
that are now being directed to the prison funds. By redirecting and
keeping the excess funds within the prison system, the public suffers
because the funds could have benefited the state of Florida as a whole.
Fortunately, modern restitution is broader than the traditional
approach and allows courts to determine and measure conferred benefits
in their own fashion. Prisons are using the number of inmates as a large
captive market to enable negotiations for bigger, better deals—such as
the one they have secured with JPay. Each time the prisons enter into a
better deal, they are increasing their profits off the backs of the inmates
and their families. Without inmate participation in the media programs,
the prison systems would receive no profits. Under this modern approach,
a court may measure the prisons’ retained benefits at the inmates’
expense by the amount of commission the prisons initially received from
the Access Contract; the reasonable value of the value-added services that
the prisons received as a benefit of the JPay Contract; the percentage of
commission that the prisons may make in a given time frame; or, perhaps,
any traceable profits, purchases, or property that derive from the inmates’
participation in the media programs.
IV. MONETIZING MISFORTUNE: SOLUTIONS TO REMEDY THE INJUSTICE
“[B]ut the very folks who often express so much concern . . . about
the cost and the expanse of the [prison] system are often very unwilling
to talk in any serious way about remedying the harm that has been
done.”150
A truly comprehensive solution to the problems created by prison
privatization would encompass both stripping prisons of any undeserved
profit and restoring any deserved benefits to inmates. Legislation is
perhaps the most practical option. An exception to the Florida
Administrative Code that would allow inmates more than one media
player resolves the problem of having to take away what inmates have
already paid for so that they can participate in a new program. Further
provisions might also require inmate representation during contract
negotiations. If for some reason this solution is not practicable, it is
imperative that prisons at least lose the financial benefits that they have
gained at inmates’ expense. Without that part of the solution, the
150. 13TH (Netflix 2016).
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incentive to contract with private companies for profit—without
consideration of inmates’ interests—will continue to create adverse
consequences for inmates.
A. Potential Remedies
In unjust enrichment claims, courts look to the benefits gained by the
defendant, rather than the plaintiff’s loss.151 Here, the FDC’s benefits
may be measured by the value-added services and commission awarded
to them by the JPay Contract. Admittedly, the commission that the FDC
will receive from the JPay Contract may be arbitrary because the contract
is new and has not yet had a significant length of time to result in an
“average” amount of commissions. However, a court may look to the
Access Contract to determine the average amount of sales or commission
earned per inmate participating in the media program. Once a court can
determine this average, inmates may have access to potential remedial
pathways.
The easiest—and, for the prisons, cheapest—option is to make an
exception to the Florida Administrative Code provision limiting inmates
to one media player. In this case, inmates may keep the limited song files
on their Access MP3 player and have the option to participate in and
benefit from the JPay Tablet Program by purchasing any new songs, ebooks, and games that the inmates desire. Here, the prisons would not
receive the second round of commission, and the commission received
on new sales is arguably harmless to the inmates since the inmates will
not incur any expenses that they would not have incurred under the
Access Contract. This option is the cheapest for the prisons because they
may justly enrich themselves moving forward in the JPay Contract
without having to worry about remedying the enrichment in the future.
However, if the option of keeping two media players is not feasible
for some legitimate reason, the disgorgement of a prison’s commission
may be an appropriate remedy.152 In this case, the court would strip the
prison of any wrongful profit received from the awarded commission of
songs previously purchased by the inmates during the Access tenure.153
Here, the prison would lose any unjust benefits (that is, double
commission) to “undo” the enrichment. If the prison had already spent
the money, the court may use a tracing technique to “trace,” or follow,
how the money was spent.154 That is, if the prison used the second round

151.
152.
153.
154.

See KULL & FARNSWORTH, supra note 132, at 1.
See Roberts, supra note 136, at 134.
See id.
See DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 401–02.
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of commission to buy new bathroom equipment, the court may award the
inmates a constructive trust or an equitable lien in the property.155
A constructive trust is not a traditional trust; it is a legal fiction.156
Once the funds are traced to that specific property, the court can issue an
injunction and force the prison to sell or forfeit the bathroom
equipment.157 A constructive trust would grant the inmates complete
title.158 However, if the funds used to purchase that bathroom equipment
were commingled with any funds that the prison already had (or justly
received), an equitable lien would be a more appropriate remedy. 159 In
the case of an equitable lien, the inmates would only receive a security
bond, which can then be used to secure a money claim.160 Here, an
equitable lien makes the most sense because the bathroom equipment
would, in a sense, belong to any inmates who repurchase songs that they
once owned on their MP3 players. The inmates could force the sale of the
bathroom equipment and use the funds from the sale to reimburse
themselves. This remedial pathway is more difficult and expensive than
allowing the inmates to keep their previously purchased MP3 players.
Alternatively, the FDC could look to the purchases made during the
Access tenure and reimburse the inmates for those purchases through
JPay store credits. Courts should consider deducting the $10 store credit
that the prisons have already provided to the inmates to begin their new
song libraries under the JPay Contract. Though it should be recognized
that $10 is not nearly enough money for inmates who have been building
their libraries for years. Under the JPay Contract, the $10 store credit
equates to approximately five songs. Any repurchased song beyond those
five songs is an unjustly retained benefit of which the prisons must be
stripped.
B. Call for Legislation
The legislature should enact policies to protect inmates’ interests.
Currently, prisons and private vendors may explicitly exclude inmates’
interests from contracts to protect themselves from litigation. When
155. See id. at 398–410.
156. See id. at 399 & n.139.
157. See id. at 410.
158. See id. at 399.
159. See id. at 409. The prison may also argue change of position as a defense. See id. at
459–62. Dobbs explains, “If, after receiving a benefit, an innocent defendant reasonably changes
position in reliance on the benefit so that liability for restitution would be inequitable, his liability
to make restitution is reduced or terminated accordingly.” Id. at 459–60. However, this defense
would likely not work because the prisons made this change in contract consciously understanding
that the contract would provide them with commission for purchases on which they had already
received a commission.
160. See id. at 407–08.
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prisons negotiate contracts that intend inmates as the sole consumers, the
contracts should reflect consideration of potential adverse consequences
and potential remedies should the contract come to an end. To achieve
this, the legislature should consider requiring prisons to have someone
representing the inmates’ interests present at the bargaining table.161
This person would represent inmates in contracting decisions that may
directly affect inmates, even when those decisions affect inmates only as
incidental third-party beneficiaries. Here, the inmates participated in a
program with the expectation of paying a onetime fee that would allow
them to take their unlocked media players home upon release from prison.
However, when the media player contract ended and the tablet contract
took its place, the inmates were adversely affected—they lost their media
players and their song libraries—without a suitable remedy; the inmates’
expectations were frustrated. At the very least, providing inmates with
warnings or disclaimers that explain how they may be impacted when a
contract with a specific private contractor ends may improve this type of
situation. To effectively address the problem, however, legislation
requiring a representative for inmates’ interests may be necessary.
Legislation to protect inmates’ interests should also limit compulsory
“all or nothing” approaches that force inmates to either agree to all terms
or abstain entirely. Here, the inmates face a compulsory contract that
forces them to surrender their media players and song libraries in
exchange for a tablet and $10 store credit.
Further, the prisons’ suggestion—allowing inmates to pay a fee to
have their media players shipped to an outside address, ostensibly to
reserve the media players for use after prison—does not provide an
adequate remedy. First, inmates have already paid for the media players
and the songs; therefore, paying a second fee to have them shipped
outside the prison does not present a fair “choice.” Second, inmates buy
their media players with the intent of using them in prison—removing a
media player from an inmate’s possession in prison and returning the
media player to his possession upon release does not repair the intrusion
on the inmate’s rights. And inmates who do not have an address to which
they can mail their media players, who do not have a friend or family
member to keep their media players for them, or who stand to be
imprisoned for years beyond the usability of the media players—or who
will never be released—receive no remedy at all. For inmates on Death
Row, for example, such a “solution” forces them to “wait” to receive the
full benefits of their purchase, which will never be possible. These
161. This concept is similar to a guardian ad litem representing the interests of children. See
generally About Us, GUARDIAN AD LITEM, https://guardianadlitem.org/about-us/ [https://perma
.cc/FV3K-CBB7].
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inmates could only send their media players to outside locations that they
will likely never visit again.
Other issues arise when participation is the only way that inmates may
receive the benefits of the program. For instance, in facilities where
access to in-person visitation with inmates has significantly decreased,162
inmates will be, in a sense, forced to pay whatever fees are attached to
video visitation to visit with loved ones. This solution provides more
flexibility to inmates coming from families of higher socioeconomic
statuses because poorer inmates may be unable to pay the additional fees
that come along with the new tablets.
CONCLUSION
State prisons are regularly affecting earned and purchased benefits of
their captive consumers: inmates. The dangers of such nontransparent and
nonaccountable decision-making are plenty, especially where explicit
contract language renders the inmates voiceless. Unjust enrichment
theory may provide a novel approach to reconsidering the scope of the
states’ unjust profiting at the expense of their captive inmates. If state
prisons are consciously taking advantage of their prison populations, it is
vital that the law seeks, at a minimum, transparency to deter and prevent
unjust enrichment in the future. The judiciary and the legislature should
create accessible pathways for inmates to protest the accrual of ill-gotten
gains occurring throughout our prison system through unjust enrichment.
This Note offers a way to better balance the power between a state and
those in its care.

162. See Mary Ellen Klas, Florida Inmates’ Families Will Have to Pay for Video ‘Visits,’
TAMPA BAY TIMES (May 31, 2018), https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2018/05/
31/florida-inmates-families-will-have-to-pay-for-video-visits/ [https://perma.cc/WWE5-CG3Y].
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